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Abstract
The intent of this research is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from
which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most preferred policy to control
a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of the other agent
(the follower). The problem is described by an infinite horizon, partially observed
Markov game (POMG). The actions of the agents are selected simultaneously at
each decision epoch. At each decision epoch, each agent knows: its past and present
states, its past actions, and noise corrupted observations of the other agent’s past
and present states. The actions of each agent are determined by the agent’s policy,
which selects actions at each decision epoch based on these data.
The leader considers multiple objectives in selecting its policy. The follower
considers a single objective in selecting its policy with complete knowledge of and in
response to the policy selected by the leader. This leader-follower assumption allows
the POMG to be transformed into a specially structured, partially observed Markov
decision process (POMDP). This POMDP is used to determine the follower’s best
response policy. A multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) is used to create
the next generation of leader policies based on the fitness measures of each leader
policy in the current generation. Computing a fitness measure for a leader policy
requires a value determination calculation, given the leader policy and the follower’s
best response policy. The policies from which the leader can select a most preferred
policy are the non-dominated policies of the final generation of leader policies created
by the MOGA. An example is presented that illustrates how these results can be
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used to support a manager of a liquid egg production process (the leader) in selecting
a sequence of actions to best control this process over time, given that there is an
attacker (the follower) who seeks to contaminate the liquid egg production process
with a chemical or biological toxin.
2
1 Introduction
The intent of this research is to provide decision support to a leader, an agent that
wishes to determine a policy that will select actions to best control a sequential stochastic
system over an infinite planning horizon, given that there is a follower, an agent that
also would like to exert control over the system for its own purposes. We assume:
• At each decision epoch, each agent knows: its past and present states, its past
actions, and noise corrupted observations of the other agent’s past and present
states.
• The leader’s and follower’s actions are selected simultaneously at each decision
epoch.
• Each agent’s policy selects actions based on data currently available to the agent.
• The follower knows the leader’s policy and determines a response policy that is
optimal with respect to the follower’s objective.
• The leader considers multiple objectives in selecting its policy.
Our objective is to find a set of non-dominated policies from which the leader can select
its most preferred policy. Such information can serve as input to a decision support
system that, for example, is based on a deterministic version of multi-attribute utility
theory (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Holloway & White, 2008). In this context, the results
presented in this paper generate options (i.e., policies) for consideration by (1) creating
multiple generations of policies and eliminating all but the non-dominated set of policies
from the last generation and (2) determining value scores for each of the policies in this
non-dominated set.
We remark that the assumption that the follower knows the policy of the leader is a
conservative assumption from the perspective of the leader and could unrealistically bias
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the game to the advantage of the follower. However, this bias is mollified by the fact that
the leader and follower do not share the same data at each decision epoch, and hence
the follower can only infer what action the leader will actually take. This assumption is
also reasonable for many applications. For example, if the leader is a large governmental
agency or corporation and the follower is an individual or group intent on attacking the
leader, then it may be reasonable to assume that the follower will know more about the
leader than the leader will know about the follower. Further, the assumption that the
follower knows the policy of the leader allows us to transform the Markov game that we
use to model leader-follower interaction into a model of sequential decision making under
uncertainty and hence to take advantage of this computationally useful transformation.
The motivating application of this research is the operation of a liquid egg produc-
tion facility in order to maximize the supply chain’s productivity while minimizing its
vulnerability to the intentional insertion of a biological or chemical toxin into the food
production and distribution system (see Manning, 2005; O’Ryan, 1996; Sobel, 2002).
For this application, we assume the leader manages the production facility and is trying
to balance two objectives: (1) maximize productivity and (2) minimize vulnerability.
See Mohtadi & Murshid (2009) for background information about this application area.
Although initially developed to model this application, we remark that the decision sup-
port process to be presented can model a particularly broad class of sequential game
applications, when all agents are intelligent and adaptive.
Many of the methodological characteristics of the decision support model presented
in this paper have been considered elsewhere in the decision, risk, and reliability analysis
literatures. Models of intelligent agents or adversaries are examined by Cardoso & Di-
niz (2009). The single-period leader-follower game has been widely used to analyze the
strategic interactions between two intelligent and adaptive agents. For example, Cavu-
soglu et al. (2013) have studied the impacts of passenger profiling on airport security
operations. Bakir (2011) analyzed resource allocation for cargo container transportation
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security. Other applications of the single-period leader-follower game are presented in
Bier (2007, 2008) and Zhuang & Bier (2007). Multi-period games have been considered
by Wang & Bier(2011), who examined a two-period leader-follower repeated game, and
by Hausken & Zhuang (2011), who studied a multi-period game with myopic agents.
Application of completely observable stochastic game to overseas cargo container secu-
rity can be found in Bakir & Kardes (2009) to capture the state dynamics over time.
Models that consider incomplete or uncertain information are presented and analyzed
by McLay (2012), Rothschild (2012) and Wang & Bier (2011).
Each of above methodological characteristics is intended to enhance the realism of
the respective model. Our model extends the existing literature on sequential games
by explicitly considering the multi-period interaction of two non-myopic agents, each
of whom adjust its decisions according to the other agent’s decisions over an infinite
planning horizon. Furthermore, our model considers the case where neither agent has
complete information about the other agent. By combining these characteristics into a
single model, as has been done in this paper, we believe that the modeling realism of the
resulting model has been further enhanced. However, and not surprisingly, additional
model realism has resulted in increased computational challenges. Dealing with these
challenges is the focus of much of this paper.
Our approach to decision support is described as follows. We begin with an initial
(i.e., first generation) set of possible leader policies. We then use a multi-objective genetic
algorithm (MOGA) to create successive generations of leader policies. Presumably, the
next generation of leader policies contains, in some sense, higher quality policies than
the current generation. We then determine the non-dominated set of the last generation
of leader policies determined and present this set to the leader. The leader can then
select the most preferred policy from this set for implementation.
Mimicking the process of natural evolution, the MOGA creates the next generation
of policies from the current set based on the fitness measures of each of the policies in
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the current set. Each fitness measure is related to an objective of the leader. We model
the interaction between the leader and follower as a partially observed Markov game
(POMG). Our POMG is a version of the partially observed stochastic game (POSG)
where the state dynamics possess the Markovian property. We assume that the follower is
aware of the policy that the leader has selected and makes use of this fact in constructing
the follower’s policy. Thus at the policy level, the game is a leader-follower (Stackelberg)
game. This assumption allows the POMG to be converted into a partially observed
Markov decision process (POMDP). The fitness measures for each leader policy in the
current generation are needed by the MOGA to create the next generation of leader
policies from the current generation. These fitness measure are computed by a value
determination procedure, given the leader policy and the follower response policy.
The paper is organized as follows. We review the pertinent literature associated with
the MOGA, POSG, and POMDP in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the MOGA
in more detail, show how the fitness measures are computed using the POMG and the
POMDP, present equilibrium conditions, and discuss the value of information. The
numerical evaluation in Section 4 applies this decision support procedure to a simplified
liquid eggs supply chain security problem and analyses the value of information for the
agents. Section 5 summarizes research results and discusses future research directions.
2 Literature Review
The research presented in this paper combines and extends results associated with
POMDP, POSG, and MOGA. We now review the pertinent literature in these three
areas of research.
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2.1 The partially observed Markov decision process
The POMDP is a model of sequential decision making under uncertainty that takes
into consideration noise corrupted and/or costly observations of the state of the system
under control. Relative to the completely observed Markov decision process (i.e., the
MDP; see Puterman, 1994), the POMDP represents a more general but significantly
more computationally challenging model. In seminal research, Smallwood and Sondik
(1973) and Sondik (1978) showed that under robust conditions the optimal cost function
for both the finite horizon and infinite horizon expected total discounted cost criterion
POMDPs is piecewise linear and convex, and presented successive approximations ap-
proaches for solving these POMDPs that exploited this structure. Zhang (2010) revisited
these structural results and convergence properties by exploiting the dual relationship be-
tween hyperplanes and points in the POMDP and related the solution of the POMDP to
the Minkowski sum problem in computational geometry. Monahan (1982), Eagle (1984),
and White and Scherer (1989) presented improved algorithms based on the structural
results. Detailed descriptions of other exact algorithms can be found in Cheng (1988),
Littman (1994b), Cassandra (1994a), Cassandra, Littman and Zhang (1997), Feng and
Zilberstein (2004), Lin and White (1998, 2004) and Naser-Moghadasi (2012). Surveys
of related solution techniques and complexity analyses for the POMDP can be found in
Monahan (1982), Lovejoy (1991), White (1991), Cassandra (1994b) and Poupart (2005).
In the development of approximate solution techniques for POMDPs, point-based
value iteration (PBVI) is presented and analysed in Pineau (2003) and Shani (2012).
Platzman (1977, 1980), White and Scherer (1994), Littman (1994a), Hauskrecht (1997),
Hansen (1998a, 1998b), Poupart (2005) examined finite memory policy and finite-state
controllers. Varakantham (2007) and Poupart (2011) focused on calculating bounds on
optimal POMDP solutions in order to evaluate the quality of approximate solutions.
Surveys of approximation methods for POMDPs can be found in Hauskrecht (2000),
Aberdeen (2003), and Yu (2007). Approximate algorithms have proved useful for large-
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scale problems (Hoey, 2010; Thomson and Young, 2010).
2.2 The partially observable stochastic game
The stochastic game introduced by Shapley (1953) represents a multi-agent planning
problem in a stochastic environment. In this setting, each player considers the conse-
quences of its own action and the actions that its opponents or teammates may take.
See Raghavan and Filar (1991), Filar (1997) and Ummels (2010) for details.
The POSG is a new, relatively unexamined generalization of the stochastic game,
where the states of the game are not precisely observed by the players and all players
make decisions based on these partial observations. Although POSGs provide a robust
framework for multi-agent planning, Bernstein (2002) showed that POSGs are com-
putationally intractable when problem size grows. Rabinovich (2003) has shown that
even epsilon-optimal approximations are NP-hard. As a result, POSGs with special
structures that enhance computational tractability are of considerable interest. Koller
(1994) provided an efficient algorithm for a two-player POSG with tree-like structure.
McEneaney (2004) focused on a game where only one player has imperfect information.
Ghosh (2004), Oliehoek (2005), and Bopardikar (2011) studied a zero-sum version of
the POSG. Emery-Montemerlo (2004) approximated POSGs with common payoffs by
a series of Bayesian games. A cooperative version of the POSG, called a decentral-
ized partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POMDP), has been studied by
Becker (2004), Bernstein (2005), Seuken (2007), and Oliehoek (2008). A survey of the
DEC-POMDP can be found in Oliehoek (2012).
It is often the case for real-world planning problems that the players’ payoffs are
neither completely aligned with others nor directly opposed. Hespanha and Prandini
(2001) proved the existence of Nash equilibrium in a two-player finite-horizon POSG.
Hansen (2004) developed a dynamic program for general POSGs by pruning very weakly
dominated strategies and then showed that this dynamic programming approach can
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achieve optimality for cooperative settings. However, this approach is computationally
infeasible for all but the smallest problems. Kumar and Zilberstein (2009) developed
an approximate solution procedure for the POSG based on Hansen’s work. Interactive
POMDPS addressed in Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi (2005) demonstrated another frame-
work for multi-agent planning.
2.3 The multi-objective genetic algorithm
Genetic algorithms, introduced by Holland (1975), are adaptive heuristic search tech-
niques that mimic the process of natural evolution. A genetic algorithm represents each
feasible problem solution in a population of solutions as a genome or chromosome, and
begins with an initial population of feasible solutions. Solutions having high measures
of fitness are preferably selected during each generation to produce the next generation
of solutions having improved fitness measures by applying genetic (e.g., mutation and
crossover) operators. After a number of generations, the population presumably evolves
to optimal or near-optimal solutions. Goldberg (1989), Forrest (1993) and Srinivas(1994)
present surveys of genetic algorithms and the theories.
Multi-objective genetic algorithms (MOGA) are designed for the simultaneous op-
timization of multiple, often competing objectives. Usually the optimal solutions are a
set of points, called the Pareto-optimal set, in the sense that no improvement can be
made in any objective without sacrificing the other objectives. MOGA pushes the Pareto
frontier towards the ideal optimal set of solutions as the algorithm proceeds. MOGA al-
gorithms include: the vector evaluated GA (VEGA) (Schaffer, 1985), the Niched Pareto
GA (NPGA) (Horn, 1994), the Pareto Envelope-based Selection Algorithms (PESA)
(Corne, 2000) and the Fast Non-dominated sorting GA (NSGA-II) (Deb, 2002). Sur-
veys are presented in Coello (2000) and Konak (2006). MOGAs have been widely applied
in optimization and decision making problems (see Ponnambalam, 2001; Deb, 2001; Om-
buki, 2006; Lin, 2008; Bowman, 2010; Yildirim, 2012).
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3 Model and Analysis
We first present the POMG model in Section 3.1. In order to determine an optimal
response policy for the follower, the POMDP is constructed by combining the POMG
model with any leader’s policy. The resulting POMDP is presented and examined in
Section 3.2. For computational reasons, we require that the leader and follower policies
be finite memory policies. However, the POMDP constructs a perfect memory follower
policy. In Section 3.3, we present an approach for determining a finite-memory approx-
imation of a perfect memory policy. In order for the MOGA to determine the next
generation of leader policies, fitness measures must be calculated for each policy in the
current generation of leader policies. Each fitness measure is associated with an objec-
tive of the leader. In Section 3.4 we present an approach for determining the fitness
measures, for any given leader policy and follower policy. Section 3.5 shows how to use
MOGA to generate a non-dominate set of leader policies. Section 3.6 and 3.7 address
equilibria and the value of information, respectively.
3.1 Partially Observed Markov Game
The partially observed Markov game (POMG) serves as the modeling basis of our
decision support system design. The POMG is comprised of:
Decision epochs: Let {0, 1, . . . } be the set of all decision epochs when both agents
select actions simultaneously. Thus, the problem horizon is countable and infinite.
State spaces: Let SL and SF be the state spaces of the leader and the follower,
respectively. Both spaces are epoch-invariant and finite. At decision epoch t, let sL(t)
be the leader’s state, sF (t) be the follower’s state, and denote s(t) = {sL(t), sF (t)}.
Action spaces: Let AL and AF be the epoch-invariant action spaces of the leader
and the follower, both of which are finite. At decision epoch t, let aL(t) be the leader’s
action, aF (t) be the follower’s action, and denote a(t) = {aL(t), aF (t)}.
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Observation spaces: Let ZL and ZF be the observation spaces of the leader and the
follower, both of which are epoch-invariant and finite. At decision epoch t, let zF (t)
be the follower’s observation of the leader’s state, zL(t) the leader’s observation of the
follower’s state, and denote z(t) = {zL(t), zF (t)}.
Systems dynamics: We assume the epoch-invariant probability P (z(t + 1), s(t +
1)|s(t), a(t)) is given. Note that
P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)) = P (z(t+ 1)|s(t+ 1), s(t), a(t))P (s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)),
where P (z(t + 1)|s(t + 1), s(t), a(t)) is referred to as the state observation probability
and P (s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)) is referred to as the state transition probability.
Information patterns: The information pattern for agent k describes what agent k
knows and when agent k knows it. Let
• Zk(t) = {zk(t), zk(t–1), . . . } and Zk(t, τ) = {zk(t), zk(t–1), . . . , zk(t–τ + 1)}
• Sk(t) = {sk(t), sk(t–1), . . . } and Sk(t, τ) = {sk(t), sk(t–1), . . . , sk(t–τ + 1)}
• Ak(t) = {ak(t− 1), ak(t–2), . . . } and Ak(t, τ) = {ak(t− 1), . . . , ak(t–τ)}
• Ik(t) = {Zk(t), Sk(t),Ak(t)}
• Ik(t, τ) = {Zk(t, τ), Sk(t, τ),Ak(t, τ)}
We assume that agent k chooses ak(t) on the basis of Ik(t), if agent k has perfect
memory, or on the basis of Ik(t, τ), if agent k has finite memory. Note that Ik(t) =
{Ik(t, τ), Ik(t− τ)}.
Single Period Cost and Criteria: Let cF (s(t), a(t)) be the decision epoch invari-
ant single period cost accrued by the follower at epoch t, given s(t) and a(t), and let
cLi (s(t), a(t)) be the decision epoch invariant single period cost accrued by the leader with
respect to criterion i at epoch t, given s(t) and a(t). The criteria under consideration
are the concomitant expected total discounted costs over the infinite horizon.
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Policies: A policy pik for agent k is a mapping from what agent k knows at epoch
t, either Ik(t) or Ik(t, τ), into its set of available actions, Ak. Policies can be random
and hence described by conditional probabilities. We restrict our interest to stationary
policies. Stationary policies tend to be easy to implement and in many cases, e.g., the
determination of optimal follower response policies for a broad class of scalar criteria,
sufficiently rich to contain an optimal policy.
Objectives: The follower’s objective is to select a stationary policy that minimizes its
criterion. The leader’s objective is to optimize all criteria under consideration in some
balanced manner, with this balance being determined by the leader. Our objective is to
provide the leader with a non-dominated set of policies from which to choose a single
policy for implementation.
3.2 Determination of a Best Response Policy p¯iF , Given a leader policy piL
Let p¯iF be the perfect memory best response policy to the leader policy piL. We
assume that the leader policy piL = {P (aL(t)|IL(t, τ))} and that the follower knows
piL. We also assume that the follower knows IF (t). (We will restrict the follower’s
information pattern to IF (t, τ) below; however, for the moment it will be convenient to
assume that the follower has perfect memory.) We remark that although the follower
knows the leader’s policy, because the information patterns of the agents are in general
different, the follower can only infer what action the leader will actually take.
Let vF (piL; IF (t)) be the follower’s optimal criterion value, given IF (t) and piL. For
notational simplicity, assume the dependence of piL is implicit; hence, vF (IF (t)) =
vF (piL; IF (t)). Then, according to results in (Puterman, 1994; Chapter 6), vF uniquely
satisfies
vF = HF vF (1)
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where for any v,
[HF v](IF (t)) = min
aF (t)
hF (IF (t), aF (t), v),
hF (IF (t), aF (t), v) = E{cF (s(t), a(t)) + βv(IF (t+ 1))|IF (t), aF (t)},
and where E is the expectation operator and the minimum is over all aF (t). We now
state our first result.
Proposition 1. Assume piL is given. Then for each sF (t) there is an at most countable
set of arrays Γ∗(sF (t)) such that:
vF (IF (t)) = min{
∑
γ(IL(t, τ))P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t)) : γ ∈ Γ∗(sF (t))},
where the sum is over all IL(t, τ).
Proof. Assume v and Γ are such that
v(IF (t)) = min{
∑
γ(IL(t, τ))P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t)) : γ ∈ Γ(sF (t))},
where the sum is over all IL(t, τ). Then straightforward analysis, following arguments
in (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973), shows that
hF (IF (t), aF (t), v) = min{
∑
γ′(IL(t, τ))P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t)) : γ′ ∈ Γ′(sF (t), aF (t))},
where the sum is over all IL(t, τ), where if γ′ ∈ Γ′(sF (t), aF (t)) then γ′ is of the form
γ′(IL(t, τ)) =
∑
aL(t)
P (aL(t)|IL(t, τ))[cF (s(t), a(t))
+ β
∑
s(t+1)
∑
z(t+1)
γi,j(zL(t+ 1), sL(t+ 1), aL(t), IL(t, τ − 1))P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))],
where γi,j can be any element in Γ(sF (t+ 1)) for each sF (t+ 1) = i and zF (t+ 1) = j.
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Then,
[HF v](IF (t)) = min{
∑
IL(t,τ)
γ′′(IL(t, τ))P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t)) : γ′′ ∈ Γ′′(sF (t))},
where Γ′′(sF (t)) = ∪aF (t)Γ′(sF (t), aF (t)).
The operator HF is a contraction operator on the Banach space comprised of all
functions mapping IF (t) into the real line, having as its norm the supremum norm, and
as a result, the sequence {vn}, where vn+1 = HF vn, converges to vF for any given v0.
The above result indicates that HF preserves piecewise linearity and concavity and in
the limit preserves concavity.
We remark that Γ′′(sF (t)) usually contains many redundant vectors, where γ is
redundant if [HF v](IF (t)) is strickly less than
∑
IL(t,τ) γ(I
L(t, τ))P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t)) for all
{P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t))}. From both storage and computational perspectives, there is a value
to keep the cardinality of Γ′′(sF (t)) as small as possible. Let the operator PURGE
be such that Γ′′′(sF (t)) = PURGE(Γ′′(sF (t))) is the subset of Γ′′(sF (t)) having the
smallest cardinality that satisfies
min{
∑
IL(t,τ)
γ′′(IL(t, τ)P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t))) : γ′′ ∈ Γ′′(sF (t+ 1))}
= min{
∑
IL(t,τ)
γ′′′(IL(t, τ)P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t))) : γ′′ ∈ Γ′′′(sF (t+ 1))}
for all {P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t))}. Related discussion about the necessity and the existence of
the PURGE operator can be found in Lin and White (1998).
With regard to the implications of Proposition 1 and results in (Puterman, 1994;
Chapter 6), vF and hence an optimal policy can depend on IF (t) only through (sF (t), yF (t)),
where yF (t) = {P (IL(t, τ)|IF (t)) : for all IL(t, τ)}. Hence, (sF (t), yF (t)) is a sufficient
statistic. Further, vF is concave in yF (t). Additionally, if γ∗(sF (t)) is a finite set of ar-
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rays for all sF (t), then vF is piecewise linear. Note that the dimension of (sF (t), yF (t))
is finite and t-invariant. Note further that the finite dimensionality of yF (t) follows
directly from the finite-memory assumption imposed on piL. Thus, assuming γ∗(sF (t))
is a finite set of arrays and vF is described in terms of (sF (t), yF (t)), vF has a finite
representation. We remark that the cardinality of Γ′(sF (t)) can be substantially larger
than the cardinality of Γ(sF (t)), where both Γ(sF (t)) and Γ′(sF (t)) are defined in the
proof of Proposition 1. Techniques for reducing the cardinality of Γ′(sF (t)) can be found
in White (1991).
3.3 A Finite-Memory Approximation to p¯iF
As noted above, an optimal policy p¯iF for the follower that achieves the minimum
in Equation 1 depends on IF (t) and hence p¯iF is a perfect-memory policy. In order to
insure that the leader criteria have finite representation, the follower policy must also
be a finite-memory policy. We determine a finite-memory (approximate) policy from a
given perfect memory policy as follows. We note that {(IF (t, τ), yF (t− τ)), t = 1, 2, . . . }
is also a sufficient statistic for this problem, with yF (t− τ) representing the influence of
data determined up through epoch t–τ . By (arbitrarily) assuming a uniform distribution
over yF (t− τ), we determine probabilities of the form P (aF (t)|IF (t, τ)). Our numerical
analyses indicate that these finite memory approximations of optimal perfect memory
policies can be remarkably accurate, even for small τ . Identifying and analyzing other
approaches for determining a finite-memory policy from a perfect memory policy is a
topic for future consideration. In the following context, we use piF to denote a finite
memory best response policy and p¯iF to represent a perfect memory best response policy
of the follower.
We remark that an alternative approach for directly determining a finite-memory
follower policy in response to a given leader policy involves determining vF as a function
of IF (t, τ), rather than as a function of IF (t). Whether or not such an approach could
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be useful is a topic of future research; see Platzman (1977) and White (1994) for related
discussion.
3.4 Fitness Measure Determination
Let vLi (pi
L, piF ; IL(t)) be the criterion value for the leader’s ith criterion, given IL(t),
a leader policy piL = {P (aL(t)|IL(t, τ))}, and a follower policy piF = {P (aF (t)|IF (t, τ))}.
For notational simplicity, we assume that the dependence of vLi (pi
L, piF ; IL(t)) on (piL, piF )
is implicit; hence, vLi (I
L(t)) = vLi (pi
L, piF ; IL(t)). Then according to results in (Puter-
man, 1994; Chapter 6), vLi uniquely satisfies
vLi (I
L(t)) = hLi (I
L(t), vLi )
for all IL(t), where
hLi (I
L(t), v) = E{cLi (s(t), a(t)) + βv(IL(t+ 1))|IL(t)}.
We now show that vLi (I
L(t)) is dependent on IL(t) only though (IL(t, τ), yL(t)),
where the array yL(t) = {P (IF (t, τ)|IL(t)) : for all IF (t, τ)}. Thus, (IL(t, τ), yL(t)) is a
sufficient statistic.
Proposition 2. Assume (piL, piF ) are given as two finite-memory policies. Then, there
is a function g∗i such that
vLi (I
L(t)) =
∑
g∗i (I
L(t, τ), IF (t, τ))P (IF (t, τ)|IL(t)),
where the sum is over all IF (t, τ). Further, g∗i is the unique solution of the equation
g∗i (I
L(t, τ), IF (t, τ)) =
∑1
P (s(t), a(t)|IF (t, τ), IL(t, τ)){cLi (s(t), a(t))
+ β
∑2
g∗i [(z
L(t+ 1), IL(t, τ − 1)), (zF (t+ 1), IF (t, τ − 1))]P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))},
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where zk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t − 1)}, ∑1 is over all s(t) and a(t), and ∑2 is over all
z(t+ 1) and s(t+ 1).
Proof. We remark that since (piL, piF ) is assumed given, P (s(t), a(t)|IF (t, τ), IL(t, τ)) is
well defined. Assume there is a function g such that
v(IL(t)) =
∑
g(IL(t, τ), IF (t, τ))P (IF (t, τ)|IL(t)),
where the sum is over all IF (t, τ). Then it is straightforward to show that there is a
function g′ such that
hLi (I
L(t), v) =
∑
g′(IL(t, τ), IF (t, τ))P (IF (t, τ)|IL(t)),
where the sum is over all IF (t, τ), and
g′(IL(t, τ), IF (t, τ)) =
∑1
P (s(t), a(t)|IF (t, τ), IL(t, τ)){cLi (s(t), a(t))
+ β
∑2
g[(zL(t+ 1), IL(t, τ − 1)), (zF (t+ 1), IF (t, τ − 1))]P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))},
and where zk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t − 1)}, ∑1 is over all s(t) and a(t), and ∑2 is over
all z(t+ 1) and s(t+ 1).The result follows directly from the following facts:
• The operator HL, where [HLv](IL(t)) = hLi (IL(t), v), is a contraction operator on the
Banach space comprised of all functions mapping IL(t) into the real line, having as its
norm the supremum norm.
• As a result, the sequence {vn}, where vn+1 = HLvn, converges to vL for any given v0.
Since both piL and piF are finite-memory policies, then both IL(t, τ) and yL(t) are
t-invariant arrays of finite dimension, which enhances the potential computability of
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vL.We remark that Proposition 2 holds for any given finite memory leader policy ρL and
follower policy ρF , and hence ρF is not necessarily a response policy to ρL.
We now summarize how fitness measures are determined for a given finite-memory
leader policy:
• Step 1: Determine a perfect memory follower response policy that achieves the mini-
mum expected cost for the follower, using Proposition 1.
• Step 2: Approximate the resulting perfect-memory follower response policy by a finite-
memory policy.
• Step 3: Given the leader policy and the follower’s approximate response policy, deter-
mine the concomitant fitness measures using Proposition 2.
3.5 Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm
We now describe how we use a multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA), NSGA-II
(Deb, 2002), to generate policies from which the leader will choose a most preferred
policy.
Let {piL(m),m = 1, . . . ,M} be the current population of the leader’s finite memory
policies, and for each m, let piF (m) be the finite memory follower’s response policy to
the leader’s policy piL(m). Further, let vLi (pi
L(m), piF (m)) be the expected cost of the
leader’s ith criterion, given the policy pair (piL(m), piF (m)).
Definition Policy piL is said to dominate policy ρL if
vLi (pi
L, piF ) ≤ vLi (ρL, ρF ), ∀i
and there exists at least one i such that
vLi (pi
L, piF ) < vLi (ρ
L, ρF ),
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where piF and ρF are the follower’s response policies to the leader’s policy piL and ρL,
respectively.
Policy piL is said to be non-dominated if there does not exist a policy that dominated
policy piL.
The MOGA constructs the next generation of policies from the current set of policies
as follows. The MOGA encodes each policy piL(m) into a chromosome. A gene is an
element of the chromosome vector, and an allele is a numerical value taken by a gene.
In the context of our model, the chromosome is a probability mass vector over the
action space, and the ith gene of the chromosome denotes the probability that action i is
selected by the leader. The MOGA then determines vLi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N for each chromosome,
where N is the number of leader’s objectives. A description of how vLi is determined
can be found in section 3.4. The tuple (vL1 , ..., v
L
N ) serves as the fitness measure of this
chromosome.
On the basis of (vL1 , ..., v
L
N ), the population of chromosomes are partitioned into
subsets called fronts, where front 1 is the set of non-dominated chromosomes, and front
k+1 is the set of non-dominated chromosomes when the chromosomes in fronts 1 through
k are removed from consideration, k = 1, 2, . . . . Chromosomes in front k are given rank k.
In addition, the crowding distance of each chromosome is determined within each front.
Crowding distance is defined as the average Euclidean distance of a chromosome to the
other chromosomes in the front, based on (vL1 , ..., v
L
N ) as a measure of position. Crowding
distance is considered a measure of diversity for the policies, and for this measure, larger
is considered better. The current generation of policies is sorted according to ranking
and crowding distance.
Parents are selected from the current generation of policies, based on their ranks
and crowding distances. Chromosomes with higher rank and larger crowding distance
are selected to generate offspring with higher probability. The selected parents form a
mating pool and generate offspring using a crossover operator. For each parents pair, the
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crossover operator randomly exchanges a portion of genes with each other to form two
new offspring. A mutation operator is also used to maintain genetic diversity from one
generation to another. This operator randomly alters a certain percentage of genes in
the current generation of policies. Then the non-dominated sorting procedure is applied
again on the current population and offspring population, the top M (population size)
chromosomes are kept and this is the next population. The whole algorithm repeats for
a certain number of iterations.
3.6 Equilibria
We remark that there are two equilibrium conditions, one associated with each agent.
With respect to the follower, assume p¯iF is the perfect memory response policy to a given
leader policy piL. Then, results in Proposition 1 imply that
vF (IF (t)) = vF (piL, p¯iF ; IF (t)) ≤ vF (piL, ρF ; IF (t))
for all follower policies ρF and all IF (t), where a direct application of the results of
Proposition 2 can be used to determine vF (ρL, ρF ; IF (t)) for any pair of leader-follower
policies (ρL, ρF ).
With respect to the leader, we now assume piF is a finite-memory approximation
of the perfect memory follower’s response policy to the given leader policy piL. Let
vL(piL, piF ; IL(t)) be the vector of criterion values for the leader’s multiple objectives,
given (piL, piF ), and information state IL(t). Our process of determining candidate
leader policies from which the leader can select the most preferred policy is intended
to determine (piL, piF ) pairs so that there exists no pair (ρL, ρF ) such that
vLi (ρ
L, ρF ; IL(t)) ≤ vLi (piL, piF ; IL(t)), ∀i
for all IL(t), where ρL represents any leader policy and ρF represents a finite-memory
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approximation of the perfect memory follower response policy to ρL.
We note that by Proposition 1 and results in (Puterman, 1994, Chapter 6), the fol-
lower policy in the first equilibrium condition is an optimal policy; hence, the follower
has no incentive to deviate from this policy. With respect to the second equilibrium
condition, we note that all of the follower’s policies are finite memory approximations
of the follower’s optimal perfect memory response policy to the leader’s policy. Further,
the process of determining the leader policies does not guarantee that pairs (piL, piF ) will
be determined that satisfy the second equilibrium condition. Thus, there is no guar-
antee that the leader will not want to deviate from the set of resultant non-dominated
leader policies. However, given a sufficient number of generations of the MOGA and
a sufficiently large τ such that the finite memory follower policy is a good approxima-
tion to an optimal perfect memory follower policy, it is reasonable to be confident that
the resultant leader will have little incentive to deviate from the set of non-dominated
leader policies generated. Figure 1 provides an outline of the process for generating these
non-dominated leader policies.
Figure 1: Outline of the decision support process
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3.7 Value of Information
We now address the question: will improved observation quality improve, or at
least not degrade, the performance of agents? With respect to the follower, assume
P (z(t+ 1)|s(t+ 1), s(t), a(t)) = P (zF (t+ 1)|sL(t+ 1), a(t))P (zL(t+ 1)|sF (t+ 1), a(t)),
and let PF (a(t)) be the stochastic matrix having ijth entry P (zF (t+ 1)|sL(t+ 1), a(t)),
where i = sL(t + 1) and j = zF (t + 1). Let QF (a(t)) be a stochastic matrix such
that for all a(t), there exists a third stochastic matrix RF (a(t)), where QF (a(t)) =
RF (a(t))PF (a(t)). Then by results in (White and Harrington, 1980), vP (IF (t)) ≤
vQ(IF (t)), where vP (IF (t)) is the value of the follower’s criterion associated with ob-
servation matrix PF (a(t)) and vQ(IF (t)) is the value of the follower’s criterion associ-
ated with observation matrix QF (a(t)). Thus, for the follower, the observation qual-
ity provided by PF (a(t)) is at least as good as the observation quality provided by
QF (a(t)) and the added value of using PF (a(t)), relative to QF (a(t)), is the difference
0 ≤ vQ(IF (t))–vP (IF (t)).
The determination of conditions that guarantee that improved observation quality
for the leader will not degrade leader performance is a topic for future research. We
remark that counterexamples exist to the general claim that better information quality
always implies improved system performance (Ortiz, Erera and White, 2012).
4 Numerical Results
This section presents an example that illustrates how the results in Section 3 can be
used to support a defender (the leader) in selecting a sequence of actions to best control
a simplified liquid egg production process over time, given that there is an attacker (the
follower) who seeks to contaminate the liquid egg production process with a chemical
or biological toxin. Both the defender and the attacker receive updated, possibly noise
corrupted, data about his/her opponent just prior to each decision epoch. The defender
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has two scalar criteria: (1) a measure of the system’s vulnerability to an attacker, which
the defender wants to minimize, and (2) a measure of the system’s productivity, which
the defender wants to maximize. The attacker’s criterion is to maximize the expected
number of packages produced by the facility that contain a sufficiently lethal dose of the
toxin.
The attacker’s and defender’s transition diagrams are presented in Figures 2 and
3, respectively. Two targets, T1 and T2 are considered. State O is the state that the
attacker is in prior to launching an attack, and includes attack team assembly, toxin
manufacture, and transportation. States PT1 and PT2 are the pre-attack states in
which the attacker is armed and ready to attack target 1 and target 2, respectively. At
each decision epoch, the attacker can either choose to stay in the current state, advance
forward to the next state, or retreat to a prior state. We remark that the transition
probability of the attacker could be affected by the defender’s strategy. An attacker’s
error or interdiction by the defender could return the attacker back to the state O.
The defender’s states include a full production low alert state (FP), a low production
high alert state (LP) and the attacked state (Att.). The defender in FP or LP could
stay in his/her current state or switch to the other state with given probabilities. If an
attack occurs, the failure of detecting an attack promptly and remain in either FP or LP
will cause significant consequences for the defender. The defender can also terminate the
game and shut down the facilities to clean the toxin if the attack is successfully detected.
Given an attack, there are two groups of outcomes: unsuccessful attacks and success-
ful attacks. If the attack is successful, the amount of toxin delivered to the consumers
is described by a cumulative distribution function. We assume that the distribution
function satisfies a standard, first-order stochastic dominance assumption.
We restrict our attention to deterministic defender policies since they are easy to
implement. Related discussion can be found in Paruchuri (2004). There are 64 defender
policies and the MOGA can probabilistically identify the Pareto efficient policies within
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Figure 2: Attacker’s transition diagram
Figure 3: Defender’s transition diagram
5 generations. The non-dominated set of policies are presented in Table 1. The defender
must then trade off productivity and vulnerability, based on his/her preferences in order
to select a most preferred policy.
Table 1: Decision Support Table
Policy Productivity Vulnerability
ratio to maximum ratio to minimum
pi1 1.000 7.077
pi2 0.959 5.737
pi3 0.942 5.633
pi4 0.847 4.136
pi5 0.691 1.000
Figure 4 compares the value of the attacker’s reward, as a function of observation
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quality. The results are consistent with the discussion in Section 3.7; i.e. improved
observation quality of the follower does not degrade the follower’s performance. A com-
parison of the value of the defender’s rewards as a function of observation quality is a
topic of future research.
Figure 4: Attacker’s reward under different qualities of observations.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
The contributions of the paper are as follows:
(1) We have blended the POMG, the POMDP, and the MOGA to identify leader
policies that are candidates for a most preferred policy in an infinite horizon, sequential
decision making environment where:
• There are two intelligent and adaptable agents, a leader and a follower, and each
can affect the performance of the other.
• At each decision epoch, each agent knows: its past and present states, its past
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actions, and the noise corrupted observations of the other agent’s past and present
states.
• The leader’s and follower’s actions are selected simultaneously at each decision
epoch.
• Each agent’s policy selects actions based on data currently available to the agent.
• The follower knows the leader’s policy and determines a response policy that is
optimal with respect to the follower’s objective.
• The leader considers multiple objectives in selecting its policy.
(2) Given the POMG, a leader policy, and the assumption that the follower selects its
policy with complete knowledge of and in response to the policy selected by the leader,
we have constructed a specially structured POMDP that leads to the determination
of a perfect-memory optimal policy for the follower (Proposition 1). We have shown
that this POMDP has a computationally useful sufficient statistic and a value function
structure described in terms of this sufficient statistic. By assuming that the leader
policy is a finite-memory policy, we have shown that the sufficient statistic is finite-
dimensional and that the value function has at least an approximate finite representation,
thus insuring that at least a near-optimal perfect-memory policy for the follower is
potentially computable.
(3) We have determined a computationally tractable procedure for calculating the
fitness measures for the MOGA, given that the policies for both agents are finite-memory
policies (Proposition 2). We have presented a simple procedure for finding a finite-
memory approximation to a perfect-memory policy and used it to find a finite-memory
policy for the follower, based on the perfect-memory policy determined through the
use of Proposition 1. The concomitant results show that there is a finite-dimensional
sufficient statistic for the related fitness measures.
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We remark that the computational tractability of procedures for determining the
follower’s response policy and the fitness measures for the MOGA is inextricably linked
to the assumption that the agent policies are finite-memory policies.
The output of the process described in this paper can serve as the options generation
phase of an option selection process; e.g., a deterministic version of multi-attribute
decision theory (Kenney & Raiffa, 1993).
Topics for future research include a sensitivity analysis in order to better understand
the robustness of the results and a study of the value of improving the leader’s quality
of observations.
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